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Abstract
We study the interactions between technological innovation, investment in human
capital and child labor. In our setting new technologies require new skills and new
skills can be developed only through schooling. In a two-stage game, first firms decide
on innovation, then households decide on education. In equilibrium the presence of
ineﬃcient child labor depends on parameters related to technology, parents’ altruism
and the diﬀusion of firm property. When child labor exists, it is due to either firms
reluctance to innovate or households’ unwillingness to educate or both. The optimal
policy to eliminate child labor depends crucially on its underlying cause. We show
that, in some cases, compulsory schooling laws or a ban on child labor are welfare
reducing, while a subsidy to innovation is the right tool to eliminate child labor and
increase welfare.
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1 Introduction
According to International Labor Organization statistics (see ILO [11]), in 1995 at least
120 millions of children between five and twelve years of age worked full time in paid
jobs, mostly in underdeveloped regions. This figure would at least double if we took into
account children who work part-time. These impressive statistics awake concern both in
developing and developed countries and command theoretical as well as policy-oriented
analysis. In June of 1999 the 174 member nations of the ILO passed an international
convention, upon ratification of which member states are pledged to eliminate the worst
forms of child labor immediately and to end, in the long run, all forms of child labor.
A central question for national governments and international organizations is therefore
how to intervene in order to reduce the extent of the phenomenon. Indeed, from the point
of view of economic theory, public intervention should be justified either by eﬃciency
arguments (for example, in the presence of some kind of externalities or coordination
failures) or by social preferences that call for some form of redistribution in favor of
children and possibly poor households. Moreover, whatever the justification is, it is clear
that any government intervention aimed at reducing or eliminating child labor will aﬀect
the current and future welfare of children and is likely to have relevant spillovers on others.
It is therefore very important to better understand the determinants of child labor and
design policy interventions upon careful analysis and research.
Since the publication of a recent paper by Basu and Van [3], there has been a surge
of interest among economists for the theoretical investigation of the causes of child labor
aiming at assessing the desirability and eﬃcacy of alternative remedies. However, almost
all contributions have so far dealt with the determinants of the supply of (child) labor,
focusing mainly on the role of poverty, fertility and liquidity constraints.1 Furthermore,
many of these contributions fail to give a clear-cut argument on the eﬃciency properties
of child labor and the welfare eﬀects of government intervention in this area.
This paper contributes to the literature on the economics of child labor by focusing
on the analysis of the determinants of the firm’s demand for unskilled (child) labor versus
more skilled labor and its interaction with the educational choices of households. In fact,
it is widely recognized by economic historians that in many circumstances the reduction or
elimination of child labor has been driven by technological progress and the substitution
of adult and educated workers for young and unskilled workers (for historical examples,
1See for example Baland and Robinson [1], Bellettini and Berti Ceroni [4], Cigno and Rosati [5], Dessy
[6], Ranjan [14] and Swinnerton and Rogers [15], [16]. An exhaustive survey of the literature on the
economics of child labor can be found in Basu [2].
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see Galbi [9], Levy [12] and Weiner [17]).
In order to tackle these issues, we develop a model that studies the relationship between
technological innovation, child labor and investment in human capital. In a two-period
economy, we analyze the joint decisions of altruistic parents (who must decide whether to
send their children to work or to school) and firms (which must decide whether to switch
to a new technology or not). These decisions are closely interrelated since the returns to
education depend on the level of technology and, in turn, the profitability of innovation
depends on the quality and skills of the labor force.
More specifically, we assume that technological innovation is decided by the owners
of a monopolistic firm. Innovation entails the adoption of a new vintage technology with
lower marginal costs of production. However, the adoption of the new vintage implies that
the old one becomes freely available to competitors2. Moreover, for the new vintage to
become operative it is necessary that the labor force acquires the adequate skills or, in
other words, that children go to school.
The equilibrium of the model is defined as the outcome of a sequential game where
the owners of the monopolistic firm (‘capitalists’) move first and decide simultaneously
whether to innovate or not and whether to send their children to school or work. After
observing the capitalists’ move, workers decide whether to send their own children to
school or work. We show that our economy always displays a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, whose features depend on the value of parameters related to the technology,
the degree of parents’ altruism and the degree of diﬀusion of firm’s property. When child
labor appears in equilibrium, that is due to either firm’s reluctance to innovate or workers’
unwillingness to educate or both.
Focusing on situations in which child labor is ineﬃcient, we argue that the adequate
policy intervention (whether compulsory schooling laws, ban on child labor, subsidies to
innovation or to education, etc.) depends crucially on the underlying causes. In particular,
we point out circumstances in which the introduction of compulsory schooling laws or a
ban on child labor are both welfare reducing, while a subsidy to innovation succeeds in
both eliminating child labor and increasing welfare.
Recent work by Dessy and Pallage [7] also stresses the complementarity between si-
multaneous decisions on technology adoption and skill accumulation. In their case such
2To justify this assumption we could imagine that the information contained in the patent protecting
the state-of-the-art technology allows competitors to imitate the previous vintage technology without
breaking the patent. In a diﬀerent context, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom [8] make the similar assumption
that previously patented products can be competitively produced by firms when further innovation occurs
in the same industry.
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complementarity gives rise to a multiplicity of Pareto-rankable Nash equilibria so that
a coordination failure between firms and households may support a suboptimal outcome
with technological stagnation and child labor. In our case, multiple equilibria are not part
of the story. On purpose, they are avoided by the sequential structure of the game: there
is always a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Accordingly, self-fulfilling ‘bad’ expec-
tations are not the cause of child labor. Consequently, we are able to push our policy
analysis beyond helping ‘good’ expectations to coordinate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
characterizes the eﬃcient outcome. Section 4 describes the equilibrium outcome. Section
5 presents comparative statics results. Section 6 discusses policy implications and section
7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a two-period economy, populated by a continuum of identical households of
measure 1. In the first period (period t) each household consists of 1 adult and n ≥ 1
children for a total of n+1 individuals. Adults live for one period, children for two, so that
only children are alive in the second period (period t + 1) and the household dimension
shrinks to n. Each individual is endowed with 1 unit of time per period. While adults
supply their units of time inelastically to the labor market, children can choose whether
to work or to go to school. The decision on children’s time use is made by their altruistic
parents. Education is free of charge so that its only (indirect) cost is the foregone labor
income of children. The benefit of education comes from human capital accumulation
that, in the second period, will allow grown-up children to operate more sophisticated
technologies.
On the demand side, due to altruism, the preferences of a typical adult (and thus of
the corresponding household) are represented by an intertemporal utility function defined
over the consumption of a unique homogeneous good. Specifically, utility is assumed to
be linear in the amounts consumed in the two periods:
U = (1 + n)ct + ρnct+1 (1)
where ct is consumption at time t and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. There are no
capital markets so that in each period expenditures equal income.3
3Given linear utility, in our model the absence of capital markets is not the source of child labor but only
a simplifying (realistic) assumption. For an analysis in which child labor arises due to credit constraints
see Ranjan [14].
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On the supply side, we adopt the dual-technology model of Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny [13] and we adapt it to our intertemporal setting. In the first period, two technolo-
gies, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, are available for the production of the unique consumption
good. Both technologies are linear and use labor as their only input. They diﬀer, how-
ever, in terms of productivity, the modern technology being more productive than the
traditional one. While the traditional technology is freely disposable, the modern one is
exclusive property of one firm only. Due to free disposal, when active, the traditional
technology is operated by perfectly competitive firms that are publicly and equally owned
by all households. On the contrary, the ownership of the modern firm is equally shared
only by a fraction θ of the households (‘capitalists’), with θ ∈ [0, 1].
Specifically, we assume that, when employed in the traditional technology, one unit of
labor produces α0 units of good, while it produces α1 > α0 units of good when employed
in the modern one. Choosing labor as numeraire, this implies that in the former case the
marginal cost of production is 1/α0 while in the latter it is 1/α1 < 1/α0.
Profit maximization leads the modern firm to exploit its cost advantage in order to
prevent traditional firms from entering the market at all. In particular, this is achieved
through limit pricing, that is, by setting a price at which traditional firms are just indif-
ferent between operating or not. That implies that in equilibrium the modern firm’s price
equals the marginal cost of traditional firms:
pt = 1/α0 (2)
The result is, thus, that the modern firm operates as a monopolist and earns nominal
profits:
Πt = (pt − 1/α1)yt (3)
where yt is its output and the term between parentheses is the price-cost margin. In real
terms, profits can be rewritten as:
πt =
Πt
pt
=
1/α0 − 1/α1
1/α0
yt =
α1 − α0
α1
yt (4)
This leads to aggregate nominal and real incomes that are respectively:
Yt = ptyt = (1/α0)yt = Πt +Nt (5)
yt = πt + α0Nt (6)
where Nt is the total number of individuals (adults plus children) who work at time t.
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Solving the system formed by (4) and (6), we obtain the following expression for profits
and income in real terms:
πt = (α1 − α0)Nt (7)
yt = α1Nt (8)
In the first period the monopolist, and thus the capitalists, also face an intertemporal
decision in that they can decide whether to update the modern technology or not. If
they do, the ‘updated’ technology will be ready for production in the second period with
productivity α2 > α1 > α0. However, its operation by grown-up children will be possible
only if they have attained an adequate level of human capital through education in the
first period. In other words, the capitalists as well as the other households (henceforth
called simply ‘workers’) face a second intertemporal decision on whether to educate their
children or not and the updated technology will be implementable only if the innovation
decision of the monopolist is matched by the education decision of the households.
More precisely, we assume that the capitalists move first in anticipation of households’
choices. The exact timing of events is the following. At the beginning of period t, the
capitalists as a group decide whether to update (I) or not (NI) as well as whether to
send their children to school (Eo) or not (NEo). Then, the workers decide whether to
send their children to school (E) or not (NE). After that, during period t, production,
education (if any) and consumption take place. Finally, at the end of period t, adults pass
away. At the beginning of period t+1, if capitalists have previously decided to update, the
new technology becomes available to the monopolist only while the outdated one becomes
freely available. Lastly, production and consumption by grown up children take place.
3 The eﬃcient outcome
We are interested in investigating child labor as a market failure. To do so, we need to
assess under which conditions child labor is ineﬃcient. Our welfare measure is the sum of
the indirect utilities of all capitalits and workers. Given linear utility this corresponds to
the present value of aggregate output y1 + ρy2.
Straightfoward calculations show that:
Proposition 1 Aggregate welfare is maximized at either (I, Eo, E) or (NI,NEo, NE).
The former dominates the latter if and only if
α2/α1 > 1 + 1/ρ (9)
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Intuitively, a planner would choose to send all children to school and to update the
technology whenever the present value of the increase in future output due to innovation
oﬀsets the current loss of production due to education. Notice that the parameter α0 is
irrelevant for the planner’s choice because it aﬀects the distribution of income but it does
not aﬀect the output increase.
In what follows we assume (9) to hold, that is, we focus on situations in which, when
child labor emerges in equilibrium, it is ineﬃcient so that there is scope for welfare-
improving policy intervention.
4 The equilibrium
We are now ready to investigate the conditions under which the market outcome is carac-
terized by ineﬃcient child labor. Specifically, we look for the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) of the two-stage game of complete and perfect information between capitalists and
workers. As we discussed above, capitalists move first. Their chosen action will be de-
noted by ao. After having observed the action of the capitalists, workers choose their own
favorite action a. Clearly, ao = (ao1, ao2) where ao1 ∈ Ao1, ao2 ∈ Ao2, Ao1 = {I,NI} and
Ao2 = {Eo, NEo}. Similarly, a ∈ A where A = {E,NE}.
Figure 1 summarizes the tree of the strategic interaction between capitalists and work-
ers with the eight possible outcomes. The associated payoﬀs are the indirect utilities of
the two interest groups, capitalists (labeled again by o) and workers (no label), calculated
from (1). To derive them, the crucial thing to keep in mind is that for the updated tech-
nology to be operative in the second period, some children must attend school in the first
period, in which case their current real labor income (α0n) is traded against higher future
real labor income (α1n). Obviously, this also implies trading oﬀ current real profit against
higher future real profit for the monopolist, since children attending school are withdrawn
from production in the first period. The eight payoﬀs of workers (A, B, C, D, E, F , G, H,
K) and the eight payoﬀs of capitalists (Ao, Bo, Co, Do, Eo, F o, Go, Ho, Ko) are reported
in the Appendix.
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I , E o I , N E o N I, E o N I, N E o 
E  N E  E  E  E  N E  N E  N E  
K,Ko G,Go F,Fo H,Ho A,Ao C,Co B ,B o D,Do 
Figure 1: The extensive-form representation of the game
4.1 The choice of workers
Let us characterize the SPE by backward induction taking into account the extensive
form depicted in Figure 1. After observing capitalists’ decisions regarding innovation and
education, workers must decide whether to send their children to school (a = E) or not
(a = NE). Here we can distinguish between three cases.
1. Given ao = (NI,Eo) or ao = (NI,NEo) workers’ optimal response is a = NE since
C > A and D > B. Intuitively, when capitalists do not innovate, the future real wage is
equal to the current one (α0), since the output price remains constant (1/α0). Workers
have therefore no incentive to send children to school, since this would imply a loss in
current labor income against a zero gain in future labor income.
2. Given ao = (I,NEo), workers’ optimal response is a = NE since F < H. If cap-
italists innovate but do not send their children to school, they will be unable to operate
the up-dated technology unless workers send their children to school. However, workers
have no incentives to do so, since they anticipate that the future real wage will be higher
in any case. The reason is the following. If workers’ children get educated at time t, the
monopolistic firm will be able to operate the updated technology at time t+1 and set the
product price at 1/α1, so that the real wage will be equal to α1. Otherwise, the monop-
olistic firm will be unable to operate the up-dated technology at time t+ 1. Nonetheless,
since innovation makes the modern technology freely disposable, a competitive fringe of
firms will step in using that technology and the real wage will be still equal to α1.
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3. Given ao = ( I, Eo), workers’ optimal response is a = E if and only if K > G, that
is if and only if ρα1 > α0. If capitalists innovate and send their children to school they
will operate the updated technology at time t + 1 no matter what workers do. In order
to decide whether to send their children to school or work at time t + 1, workers must
compare the loss in terms of current labor income (opportunity cost of education), α0,
with the discounted net gain in terms of future labor income, which is given by ρα1 since
in this case only educated workers can be employed at time t+ 1.
Thus, for workers to be willing to send their children to school it must be ρα1 > α0.
4.2 The choice of capitalists
We can now turn to the characterization of capitalists’ best course of action, given workers’
best responses. Capitalists must take two simultaneous decisions: whether to adopt the
new vintage technology (ao1 = I) or not (ao1 = NI) and whether to send their children to
school (ao2 = Eo) or not (ao2 = NEo).
It is immediate to verify that, anticipating workers’ best responses, capitalists always
prefer ao = (NI,NEo) to ao = (NI,Eo), since Do > Co and Bo > Ao. Intuitively, if
capitalists decide not to update the modern technology, in their role of workers they will
have no incentives to send their children to school, since this would imply a loss in terms
of current labor and profit income against a zero gain in terms of future labor and profit
income.
By the same token, ao = (NI,NEo) is preferred to ao = (I,NEo) since Do > Ho. As
we know, if capitalists innovate but do not send children to school, workers will not send
children to school either so that capitalists will be unable to operate the new technology in
period t+1 but, at the same time, also to prevent the entry of the competitive fringe. For
θ < 1, if the capitalists send their children to school, the ensuing loss in terms of discounted
profit income, ρ (α1 − α0)n, is always larger than the gain in terms of discounted wage
income, θρ (α1 − α0)n.
Therefore, we can conclude that
Remark 2 In equilibrium children never attend school in the absence of innovation and
innovation is impossible unless some children go to school.
Once we have eliminated actions ao = (NI,Eo) and ao = (I,NEo), we can finally
analyze the capitalists’ choice between action ao = (I, Eo) and ao = (NI,NEo). Diﬀerent
scenarios emerge depending on workers’ willingness to send their children to school, that
is depending on the relation between ρα1 and α0.
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1. When ρα1 > α0, capitalists prefer ao = (I,Eo) to ao = (NI,NEo) if and only if
Ko > Do, that is if and only if:
(1/θ)[ρ(α2 − α1)− (1 + ρ)(α1 − α0)]n+ [ρα1 − (1 + ρ)α0]n > 0 (10)
In words, if the discounted future income gain in terms of higher profits, that is
ρ [(α2 − α1)− (α1 − α0)]n, and higher wages, ρ (α1 − α0) θn, is larger than the oppor-
tunity cost of innovation in terms of current income [(α1 − α0) + θα0]n, capitalists will
innovate and send their children to school. As we know, this in turn implies that workers
will also send children to school, so that (I, Eo, E) would be the SPE of the game.
If condition (10) is not satisfied, capitalists do not innovate and nobody sends children
to school, so that (NI,NEo, NE) is the SPE of the game. Notice that in this case
child labor emerges as a consequence of capitalists’ resistance to innovation as well as to
education and hurts workers who would have been better oﬀ had the firm innovated.
2. When ρα1 < α0 (i.e. when workers never send children to school), capitalists prefer
ao = (I, Eo) to ao = (NI,NEo) if and only if Go > Do, that is if and only if:
(1/θ)[ρθ(α2 − α1)− (θ + ρ)(α1 − α0)]n+ [ρα1 − (1 + ρ)α0]n > 0 (11)
The net gain from profits following innovation is diﬀerent with respect to the preceding
case since only capitalists’ children go to school at time t (implying a smaller loss in current
profit) and work at time t + 1 (implying a smaller gain in future profits). In this case,
the SPE equilibrium of the game would be (I, Eo, NE), implying innovation and ‘partial’
child labor: only capitalist oﬀsprings go to school.
If condition (11) is not satisfied, capitalists do not innovate and nobody sends children
to school, so that (NI,NEo, NE) is the SPE of the game. In this case, both workers and
capitalists resist education.
In order to summarize the above results, it is useful to provide a graphical representa-
tion of the possible equilibrium outcomes. Denote with EE, II and IEo the loci defined
respectively by the following equations:
α1
α0
=
1
ρ
(12)
α2
α1
= 1− θ + 1 + ρ
ρ
− (1− θ)1 + ρ
ρ
1
α1/α0
(13)
α2
α1
=
ρ+ θ
ρθ
− 1− θ
θ
1
α1/α0
(14)
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in the (α1/α0, α2/α1) space. Notice that II and IEo are derived by equations (10) and
(11). Figure 2 depicts the three loci for 0 < θ < 1 and θ + ρ < 1 in the relevant area
defined by (9).
S W
N W N E
S E
α2/α1
α1/α0 1+1/ρ  0 1+1/ρ1/ρ
 EE
 IEO  II
Figure 2: The equilibrium (0 < θ < 1)
By inspection of Figure 2, we can restate the above results as follows:
Proposition 3 The II, EE and IEo loci identify four regions. To the left of EE, there
is partial child labor (only capitalists’ children go to school) above the IEo locus (region
NW ) and complete child labor below it (region SW ). To the right of EE, there is no child
labor above the II curve (region NE) and complete child labor below it (region SE).
Notice that, while in region SE child labor is the result of firm’s resistance to innovation
(since the price-cost margin after innovation is low relative to the current one), in region
SW both workers and capitalists resist education and innovation (also the wage increase
is low). Moreover, even if in region NW the (profit) gain from innovation is high enough
to make updating beneficial for the capitalists, wage growth following innovation is not
high enough to make education beneficial for the workers. In this case, child labor occurs
among workers notwithstanding firm’s willingness to innovate.
5 The role of property diﬀusion
Let us now analyze how the equilibrium characterization depends on the degree of property
diﬀusion of the monopolistic firm θ. Comparative statics results are summarized by Figure
3.
10
On the one hand, as θ increases, making property more diﬀuse and each owner’s share
smaller, the II locus rotates clockwise around point (1+1/ρ, 1+1/ρ) and becomes flatter,
reaching
α2
α1
= 1+1/ρ as θ tends to 1. Ceteris paribus, this makes region NE larger (and
region SE smaller). On the other hand, the IEo locus rotates clockwise around point
(1, 1 + 1/ρ) and becomes flatter, also reaching
α2
α1
= 1 + 1/ρ as θ tends to 1. Ceteris
paribus, this makes region NW larger (and region SW smaller).
In order to understand the eﬀect of changes in θ on the II locus, notice that (13) can
be rewritten as:
[ρα1 − (1 + ρ)α0] + (1/θ)[ρ(α2 − α1)− (1 + ρ)(α1 − α0)] = 0 (15)
where the first term represents the net discounted gain (or loss) from innovation for capi-
talist households deriving from wage growth and the second term represents the net gain
(loss) deriving from profit growth.
When the first term is negative (positive), an increase in θ implies that a higher (lower)
net gain from profit growth is required for the above equation to be satisfied. For example,
in region SE innovation favors capitalists in terms of wages, but hurts them in terms of
profits. Thus, when the weight of profit income decreases (θ increases), a smaller gain
from wage growth is necessary to compensate capitalists for the profit loss. Hence, region
SE shrinks as θ increases (given (α1 − α0), (α2 − α1) must decrease).
S W
N W N E
S E
α2/α1
α1/α0 1+1/ρ  0 1+1/ρ1/ρ
 EE
 IEO  II
Figure 3: The equilibrium (θ grows)
In the limit case where θ = 1 (i.e. the property of the firm is perfectly diﬀused), the
IEo and II loci both collapse to α2/α1 = 1 + 1/ρ, and the EE locus becomes irrelevant
since there are no ‘pure’ workers. Therefore, innovation always takes place and child labor
disappears.
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In a diﬀerent framework, Swinnerton and Rogers [15] [16] also discuss the relationship
between firm property diﬀusion (equality) and child labor incidence. In their analysis,
a reduction in inequality can raise poor families income above the subsistence level and
permit them to withdraw chidren from work. Our point is quite diﬀerent. More diﬀused
property of the firm reduces child labor because it tends to remove the distributional
conflict regarding innovation and education between workers and capitalists.
In the limit case where θ = 0, the IEo locus is no longer relevant and the EE and II
loci divide the space in three regions (see Figure 4). An equilibrium with (complete) child
labor and no innovation occurs in all regions but one, that is the region to the right of
EE and above II (region NE0), where the monopolistic firm innovates and workers send
children to school. In region SE0, that is to the right of EE and below II, child labor
occurs because the monopolist resists innovation (profit after innovation are low relative
to current one). In region W , that is to the left of EE child labor occurs because workers
are not willing to educate their children (wage growth following innovation is small).
W
N E’
S E’
α2/α1
α1/α0 1+1/ρ  0 1+1/ρ1/ρ
 EE
 II
Figure 4: The equilibrium (θ = 0)
6 Policy analysis
Figure 2 reveals that there are three sources of ineﬃcient child labor depending on the
combinations of α1/α0 and α2/α1. In region NW in equilibrium there is technological up-
date but only capitalists educate their children (‘elitarian push’). In region SW , workers’
opposition to education forces all children to work (‘educational impasse’). In region SE,
it is capitalists’ opposition to innovation that forces all children to work (‘technological
impasse’). Therefore, in all three regions there is scope for government intervention.
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To analyze government intervention, let us add an initial stage to the previous two-
stage game. In the initial stage, the government announces its economic policy (to which
it is committed) in order to achieve the eﬃcient allocation (I, Eo, E). In the second and
third stage, after being informed about government policy, capitalists and workers choose
their optimal actions, in order to maximize their welfare.
As we have discussed above, in each region of Figure 2 the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium
originates from diﬀerent sources; thus, the appropriate government policy will depend on
parameter values. In particular, since in regions NW and SW the ineﬃciency stems from
the fact that workers do not find it worthwhile to educate their children, optimal inter-
vention entails a subsidy to education financed through lump-sum taxation on capitalists
(or, equivalently, on profits). Indeed, in both cases, universal education would allow the
capitalists to fully reap the benefits of technological innovation, in terms of higher profits.
Diﬀerently, in region SE the source of ineﬃciency is the capitalists’ unwillingness to
innovate. In this case optimal intervention entails a subsidy to innovation funded through
lump-sum taxation on workers (or, equivalently, on wages).
Let us now calculate the minimum subsidy which implements the eﬃcient allocation.
• Region NW - Elitarian push:
Assume that the government announces that it will pay a subsidy to every household
(whether capitalist or worker) which sends its children to school. The minimum net subsidy
received by workers must be such that they are indiﬀerent between outcome (I,Eo, NE)
and outcome (I, Eo, E). Given the payoﬀs associated to these outcomes, straightforward
calculations show that the total subsidy that has to be paid to all households is S =
n(α0− ρα1). Since this subsidy is financed through lump-sum taxation on profits, the net
amount paid by capitalists (that is, the subsidy received by workers) is (1−θ)n(α0−ρα1).
Formally, if we denote the action of the government with ag, we can write ag = (S, Tπ) =
(n(α0 − ρα1), n(α0 − ρα1)) where Tπ is the tax on profit. It is immediate to show that
given ag, the equilibrium outcome of the three-stage game is (I, Eo, E) and every player
is at least as well oﬀ as in the two-stage game in which the government was inactive.
• Region SW - Educational impasse:
Again, assume that the government pays a subsidy to every household which sends
its children to school. The net subsidy received by workers must be such that they are
indiﬀerent between outcome (NI,NEo, NE) and outcome (I, Eo, E). Thus, the total
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amount of the subsidy to be paid is S = n(α0 − ρα1 + ρα0). This subsidy is financed
through lump-sum taxation on profits. Thus the net amount paid by capitalists is (1 −
θ)n(α0− ρα1 + ρα0). In this case, ag = (S, Tπ) = (n(α0− ρα1 + ρα0), n(α0− ρα1+ ρα0)).
Again, given ag, the equilibrium outcome of the three-stage game is (I, Eo, E) and every
player is at least as well oﬀ as in the two-stage game.
• Region SE - Technological impasse:
Now, assume that the government pays a subsidy to capitalists who innovate. The net
subsidy received by capitalists must be such that they are indiﬀerent between outcome
(NI,NEo, NE) and outcome (I, Eo, E). Since this subsidy is financed through lump-sum
taxation on wages, it can be easily verified that the total amount of the subsidy to be paid
is S0/(1− θ) where:
S0 = (α1 − α0)(1 + ρ− θρ) + θα0 − ρ(α2 − α1). (16)
Once again, given ag = (S, Tw) = (S0/(1− θ), S0/(1− θ)), the equilibrium outcome of the
three-stage game is (I, Eo, E) and every player is at least as well oﬀ as in the two-stage
game.
Our previous analysis can be used to evaluate one of the most commonly used form of
intervention against child labor, namely compulsory education laws.
On the one hand, in regions NW and SW , the implementation of legislative measures
to eliminate child labor provides the firm with the right incentives to innovate.4 However,
the resulting technological upgrade will benefit the owners of the monopolistic firm at
the expenses of the workers who are forced to send their children to school. In this case,
without any compensation to workers, legislative measures are not Pareto improving and
imply a redistribution of income from workers to capitalists, where the latter enjoy the
welfare gain from universal education at zero cost.
From a political economy perspective, the opportunity of such redistribution may jus-
tify the political (and economic) support of these measures by the owners of the firms.
Weiner [17] discusses a historical example where the owners of the firms were in favor of
the introduction of legislative measures against child labor. According to him “in India
the proprietors of large businesses have not opposed child-labor laws... One of the com-
plaints of managers of large firms is that their labor force is not suﬃciently educated, that
4 In this paper we abstract from the problem of enforceability and implementability of legislative mea-
sures. For an analysis of the role of legislation enforcement in the fight against child labor, see Bellettini
and Berti Ceroni [4].
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too many workers are unable to read manuals or follow the simple instructions written on
machines”. Galor and Moav [10] provide several historical examples to argue that in the
second phase of the Industrial Revolution “the capitalists were among the prime benefi-
ciaries of the potential accumulation of human capital by the masses”, so that they had
the incentives to financially support public education.
On the other hand, notice that, in region SE, compulsory schooling legislation alone
would bring about a welfare loss for all agents, since every child would be forced to go to
school but firms would still not find it profitable to innovate. In this case, from a political
point of view, legislative measures aimed at reducing the incidence of child labor would
be hard to implement in the absence of innovation subsidies.5
7 Conclusion
By focusing on poverty and the determinants of the supply of child labor, a recent lit-
erature has tried to assess the welfare consequences of government intervention aimed at
the reduction or elimination of the phenomenon. This paper adds to this literature by
supplementing the analysis with an investigation of the determinants of the demand of
the firm for child labor. More specifically, we study the relationship between technological
innovation, education, and child labor in a setting where the returns to education depend
on the level of technology and the profitability of technological upgrade depends on the
quality of the labor force.
Our framework allows us to derive clear-cut welfare implications of public intervention
in the area of child labor. In general, we have shown that legislative intervention (that
is, child labor bans and compulsory education laws) cannot be Pareto improving unless
some kind of redistribution from the owners of the firm to the workers also takes place.
Moreover, there are cases where legislation alone decreases the welfare of all agents, since
it does not provide the right incentives for the firm to innovate. In this case, the optimal
policy would be to subsidize technological upgrade.
The simplicity of the framework also shows a potential for fruitful extensions. First,
our model could be extended to a multi-period set-up. This would allow one to fully
capture the long-run consequences of child labor and public intervention on human capital
accumulation and economic development. Second, it could be enriched from a political
economy point of view to investigate the role of diﬀerent institutional mechanisms in
mediating the conflicting interests of households and firms.
5 Indeed, subsidies alone would achieve eﬃciency even without compulsory schooling legislation.
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Appendix - The payoﬀs of the game
• Workers’ payoﬀs
A ≡ (1− θ)α0(1 + ρn) associated to outcome (NI,Eo, E)
B ≡ (1− θ)α0(1 + ρn) associated to outcome (NI,NEo, E)
C ≡ (1− θ)α0[1 + (1 + ρ)n] associated to outcome (NI,Eo,NE)
D ≡ (1− θ)α0[1 + (1 + ρ)n] associated to outcome (NI,NEo, NE)
K ≡ (1− θ)(α0 + ρα1n) associated to outcome (I, Eo, E)
F ≡ (1− θ)(α0 + ρα1n) associated to outcome (I,NEo, E)
G ≡ (1− θ)α0(1 + n) associated to outcome (I,Eo,NE)
H ≡ (1− θ)[α0(1 + n) + ρα1n] associated to outcome (I,NEo,NE)
• Capitalists’ payoﬀs:
Ao ≡ θα0(1 + ρn) + (1 + ρn) (α1 − α0)
Bo ≡ θα0[1 + (1 + ρ)n] + (α1 − α0) [1 + (ρ+ θ)n]
Co ≡ θα0(1 + ρn) + (α1 − α0) [1 + (1 + ρ− θ)n]
Do ≡ θα0[1 + (1 + ρ)n] + (α1 − α0) [1 + (1 + ρ)n]
Ko ≡ θ(α0 + ρα1n) + (α1 − α0) + ρ (α2 − α1)n
F o ≡ θα0(1 + n) + (α1 − α0) (1 + θn) + ρ (α2 − α1) (1− θ)n
Go ≡ θ(α0 + ρα1n) + (α1 − α0) [1 + n(1− θ)] + ρ (α2 − α1) θn
Ho ≡ θα0(1 + n) + (α1 − α0) (1 + n) + ρθα1n
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